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Customer Concentration, Cost Structure, and Performance 
Abstract 
We examine how suppliers’ relationship-specific cost structure decisions affect future 
performance. We argue that suppliers can avoid risk by choosing more flexible cost structures 
(less fixed-to-variable costs) or commit resources by choosing more rigid cost structures (more 
fixed-to-variable costs). Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we 
document that suppliers with greater customer concentration make relationship-specific 
investments with less flexible cost structures. Our primary findings suggest that suppliers making 
relationship-specific investments with more flexible cost structures outperform those with more 
rigid ones. We also find that, while suppliers’ competitive environment has no effect on the 
relative profitability of their relationship-specific cost structure decisions, suppliers in more 
competitive industries make less flexible relationship-specific investments, further exacerbating 
the risk associated with higher customer concentration. Our results suggest that a risk avoidance 
strategy outperforms a commitment strategy in the context of relationship-specific cost structure 
decisions.  
 
JEL: M41; L25. 
Keywords: customer concentration; cost structure; transaction cost economics; competition. 
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I. Introduction 
Understanding the effect of customer concentration on firms’ decisions has become 
increasingly important for both researchers and practitioners as customer bases become more 
concentrated. Transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that firms with greater customer 
concentration are likely to make more relationship-specific investments in an effort to decrease 
the customer’s cost of buying from the supplier relative to the customer making the product 
themselves or buying from another supplier. These relationship-specific investments will exhibit 
different proportions of fixed-to-variable costs depending on managers’ cost structure decisions. 
More rigid (i.e. less flexible) cost structures, those with higher proportions of fixed-to-variable 
costs, allow firms to generate higher profits when sales are strong, but result in lower profits 
when sales are weak. Thus, the quality of managers’ relationship-specific cost structure decisions 
depends on their ability to accurately gauge the benefits and risk associated with making these 
investments. 
In this study, we examine how supplier firms’ relationship-specific cost structure 
decisions affect future performance. We focus on firms’ cost structure decisions because they are 
one of the most important strategic choices that managers make as they directly affect current 
and future profitability (Holzhacker, Krishnan, and Mahlendorf 2015a). Traditional wisdom in 
managerial accounting suggests that managers choose more flexible (higher proportion of 
variable-to-fixed costs) cost structures when they face greater risk (Garrison, Noreen, and 
Brewer 2011). However, recent research has found that the choice of more rigid cost structures 
can be a beneficial strategy for firms facing certain types of risk. Banker, Byzalov, and Plehn-
Dujowich (2014) develop a theoretical model, which predicts that firms may benefit from more 
rigid cost structures when the cost of not meeting customer demand outweighs the cost of 
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maintaining idle capacity. Thus, while making relationship-specific investments with more 
flexible cost structures may help suppliers avoid the risks associated with the loss of strong 
customers, the need to meet the ongoing demands of major customers may outweigh the desire to 
avoid this risk and lead suppliers to commit greater resources leading to more rigid cost 
structures. 
Prior studies have documented the benefits and risk associated with making relationship-
specific investments. Patatoukas (2012) examines the financial benefits to having strong 
customers. Using DuPont analysis, he documents that firms with higher customer concentration 
have better operating performance and their stock prices react positively to changes in customer 
concentration. Irvine, Park, and Yildizhan (2016) extend Patatoukas (2012) by examining the 
effect of relationship length on the association between customer concentration and finical 
financial performance. They find that suppliers exhibit higher profits as the age of the 
relationship between the strong customer and supplier increases, and note that one reason for this 
finding is that suppliers make relationship-specific SG&A investments with less flexible cost 
structures, in the early stages of the relationship. However, Irvine et al. (2016) do not explore 
whether the cost structure of relationship-specific investments has any impact on suppliers’ 
future performance. 
Using data from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 1993 through 2012, we 
extend prior research by examining the effect of relationship-specific cost structure decisions on 
suppliers’ future profitability.1 Our focus on a single industry sector, rather than on a broader 
sample of businesses, allows us to avoid the problem of inter-industry variation in cost structure 
noted in prior research (Balakrishnan, Labro, and Soderstrom 2014). For example, 
                                                             
1 We end our sample in 2012 because we require three years of subsequent data for future performance tests, which 
we discuss in the Data and methodology section. 
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manufacturing overhead consists of fixed and variable costs, which are recorded in a 
manufacturing firms’ cost of goods sold (COGS). Thus focusing on an overly broad sample of 
firms can create comparability issues when analyzing different types of costs.2   
Given our focus on the manufacturing sector, we begin our analysis by examining the 
effect of customer concentration on cost structure in our setting. Using firm-specific cost 
structure models similar to those developed in Irvine et al. (2016), we measure cost elasticity as a 
firm’s log change in costs divided by its log change in revenue from the prior year. Our results 
indicate that higher levels of customer concentration are negatively associated with SG&A, 
COGS, and operating cost (OC) elasticities, which suggests that suppliers with strong customers 
make relationship-specific investments that consists of greater fixed-to-variable costs (i.e. less 
flexible cost structures). While Irvine et al. (2016) document this results for SG&A costs only, 
our finding that customer concentration is associated with less flexible COGS is consistent with 
our assertion of greater comparability of cost categories in our setting.  
Our primary analysis focuses on the effect of suppliers’ relationship specific cost 
structure decisions on future profitability. A key implication of Irvine et al. (2016) is that 
suppliers that invest more in relationship-specific fixed assets are at greater risk to recognize 
future losses should the relationship end before the supplier can recoup their fixed cost 
investments. Holzhacker et al. (2015b) explain that more flexible cost structures allow managers 
to guard against financial risk, which in our setting would apply to losing a major customer or to 
a major customer exerting their bargaining power to negotiate a more favorable deal. Studies 
from the TCE literature such as Williamson (1979) posit that relationship-specific investments 
                                                             
2 An example of this issue is the difference in composition of cost of goods sold (or cost of sales) across industries. 
In manufacturing firms, cost of goods sold includes direct materials, direct labor, and manufacturing overhead, while 
the cost of goods sold for retail firms may include wholesale markups, etc. The composition of cost of goods sold 
also differs within the Compustat database (according to its data definitions), reducing comparability across 
industries within the same Compustat line item. 
5 
 
may expose suppliers to greater risk as strong customers use their superior bargaining power to 
extract rent from suppliers by threatening to stop buying from the supplier.3 To the extent that 
these relationship-specific investments have more rigid cost structures, this will increase the risk 
of rent extraction by strong customers as suppliers will have greater difficulty adjusting cost 
downward should a strong customer leave. However, Kang, Mahoney, and Tan (2009) point out 
that the conventional view of Williamson (1979) ignores that managers may be willing to make 
these investments because they foresee positive spillovers or believe these investments will 
strengthen the bond between the customer and supplier, reducing the probability of defection 
(Kang et al. 2009; Dekker, Sakaguchi, and Kawai 2013).4  
Given the conflicting theory on the relative profitability of flexible versus rigid 
relationship-specific cost structures, we exploit variation in these decisions and examine their 
effect on supplier firms’ future performance. We define the flexibility of relationship-specific 
investments as the interaction of a supplier’s customer concentration with its cost elasticity. 
Suppliers with more elastic cost are interpreted to have more flexible cost structures and as 
customer concentration increases, the firms’ relationship-specific investments are defined as 
being more flexible. We then examine the effect of this flexibility on future performance, defined 
as return on assets (ROA) in the subsequent three years (following Gunny 2010; Eldenburg et al. 
2011). Our findings indicate that suppliers that make more flexible relationship-specific 
investments outperform those that chose more rigid relationship-specific investments. 
                                                             
3 For example, Walmart recently made news when they attempted to use their superior bargaining power to force 
additional storage fees and extended payment terms on their supplier network (Pettypiece and Townsend, 2015). 
While some vendors have chosen to take legal action in order to prevent the unilateral imposition of new costs by 
Walmart, other vendors, particularly those in more competitive industries, are left with little recourse given the 
potential for Walmart to retaliate by reducing product orders or by simply ending their customer relationship 
entirely. 
4  For example, investments in customized machinery allow suppliers to provide custom orders for specific 
customers at lower costs relative to their competitors. Similarly, investments in specialized inventory management 
systems support more efficient production and logistics planning within the relationship. 
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Importantly, we control for the age of the suppliers relationships with their strong customers, 
using the method developed by Irvine et al. (2016), and find that the flexibility of the suppliers’ 
relationship-specific investments is incremental to that of relationship age. 
As a cross-sectional test, we examine how suppliers’ competitive environment affects the 
association between relationship-specific cost structure decisions and future performance. 
Theory posits that suppliers operating under higher competition face greater operating risks 
because customers have more substitute suppliers to buy from (Dhaliwal et al. 2016). Measuring 
suppliers’ product market competition using the firm’s three digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) and the product market fluidity score (Fluid) developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2014), we find no evidence that product market competition affects the relative 
profitability of relationship-specific cost structure decisions. However, we do observe that 
suppliers in more competitive industries make less flexible relationship-specific investments than 
those in less competitive industries. This implies that competition exacerbates the risk associated 
with higher customer concentration through greater cost rigidity. 
In supplemental analysis, we explore whether less flexible (more rigid) relationship-
specific investments lead to improved relationships with strong customers as suggested by prior 
literature (Jia 2013). We find no evidence that more rigid relationship-specific investments 
improve future sales growth to strong customers or the subsequent duration of the relationship 
between suppliers and their strong customers. Furthermore, our findings are robust to alternative 
models of testing cost structure decisions, separately examining SG&A and COGS flexibility, 
and the use of different sample periods.  
Our study contributes to the accounting literature in a number of ways. First, we add to 
the cost structure literature (see Banker et al. 2016) by examining the performance consequences 
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of relationship-specific cost structure decisions.5 Drawing from managerial accounting and TCE 
theory, we argue that suppliers facing higher customer concentration can either manage risk 
through more flexible (i.e. more elastic) cost structures or make greater commitments to their 
strong customers by choosing more rigid cost structures. We examine the relative profitability of 
a risk avoidance versus a commitment strategy in the context of strong customers where there is 
high demand for relationship-specific investments. Our finding that the decision to make more 
flexible relationship-specific investments is positively associated with future performance 
informs the accounting literature about the effect of cost structure decisions on future 
profitability. 
Second, we extend the literature on the determinants of cost structure decisions (Banker 
2014, Holzhacker et al. 2015a and 2015b, Hall 2016) by examining the effect of competition. 
Particularly, we complement Irvine et al. (2016) by documenting that suppliers operating under 
higher competition make less flexible relationship-specific investments than suppliers operating 
under lower competition. Theory suggests that suppliers facing higher competition may commit 
more resources to their strong customers because of relatively weaker bargaining power or as a 
strategy to bind the strong customer to the supplier. While we cannot speak to the ex ante 
reasoning for these investment decisions, our finding that more rigid (i.e. less flexible) 
relationship-specific investments result in less profitable future performance suggests that 
strategies that seek to bind strong customers through greater investments in fixed costs are 
relatively less successful than those that avoid risk through more flexible costs.  
                                                             
5 Balakrishnan et al. (1996) examine the performance effects of JIT investment and find that firms with greater 
customer concentration have lower accounting returns to JIT adoption. Aboody et al. (2014) examine the effect of 
firms’ overall cost structure decisions and find that more rigid cost structure are associated with higher future 
earnings (on average), but lower earnings when there is a negative revenue shock. By contrast, our study examines 
the effect of relationship-specific cost structure decisions on future performance in light of theoretical predictions 
derived from the TCE literature. 
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Third, our findings complement those of Patatoukas (2012) and Irvine et al. (2016) by 
contributing to the understanding of how customer concentration affects firm performance. 
Patatoukas (2012) finds that financially healthy firms benefit from customer concentration 
through higher levels of ROA and Irvine et al. (2016) documents that these benefits increase with 
the length of the relationship with firms’ strong customers. Our results contribute to these studies 
by documenting that the cost structure impact of relationship-specific investments affects ability 
of firms to profit from strong customer relationships. While customer concentration has the 
potential to improve performance, a key implication of our study is that managers should prefer a 
risk management strategy to a commitment strategy by choosing relationship-specific 
investments that result in more flexible cost structures. 
Finally, our findings help to bridge the gap between financial and managerial accounting 
research by providing insights about one of the mechanisms that affects the relationship between 
customer concentration and supplier firm risk. Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that customer 
concentration increases suppliers’ cost of capital, particularly for firms at higher risk of customer 
defection. Our results add to their findings by suggesting that relationship-specific cost structure 
decisions may contribute to the documented higher cost of capital since prior research finds that 
higher levels of operating leverage are associated with higher cost of capital (Lev 1974; 
Mandelker and Rhee 1984).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of relevant 
literature and motivates our research questions. Section III describes our empirical methodology, 
while Section IV presents and discusses our results. Section V provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Literature review and research questions 
Customer concentration 
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 Customer concentration refers to the number and relative size of customers that 
contribute to a firm’s revenues. As a higher proportion of overall revenues is contributed by a 
firm’s major (i.e. largest) customers, that firm is said to exhibit a higher level of customer 
concentration (Patatoukas 2012). The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131 
(FASB 1997) requires that firms disclose the presence of any and all customers who contribute 
10% or more of enterprise-wide revenue, either to a single segment or across multiple segments. 
The FASB and SEC’s decision to mandate major customer disclosure reflects the idea that the 
existence of major customers is important in helping investors to assess firm risk (Dhaliwal et al. 
2016). Despite the perceived risks, Patatoukas (2012) documents an upward trend in customer 
concentration since SFAS 131 became effective. 
 While prior studies suggest that relationship-specific investments lower suppliers’ 
profitability (Lustgarten 1975), Patatoukas (2012) focuses on firms with positive operating 
performance and documents that firms with higher customer concentration exhibit higher ROA, 
lower SG&A expenses, and better asset turnover rates. Irvine et al. (2016) further these findings 
by extending their sample to include firms with negative operating performance. They find that 
the positive effect of customer concentration on operating performance increases with the length 
(in time) of the relationship between suppliers and their major customers, possibly due to 
suppliers making relationship-specific investments, with more rigid costs structures, in the earlier 
part of the relationship. However, they do not examine why firms would be willing to sacrifice 
profits early in the relationship and whether this decision is good for suppliers, especially since 
doing so will decrease profits even more if their strong customers leave before the supplier can 
recoup their initial investment.6    
                                                             
6 While both customers and suppliers make relationship-specific investments, we focus on suppliers’ investments 
because of the risk attributed to suppliers (from the TCE literature), and because data for customers are only 
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Relationship-specific investments 
 TCE focuses on whether a transaction is more efficiently performed within a firm or by 
an outside supplier (Geyskens, Jan-Benedict, and Kumar 2006), and provides a number of 
insights as to why suppliers choose to engage in relationship-specific investments. TCE suggests 
that customer firms will contract with outside suppliers for a certain product because the outside 
supplier can achieve higher product quality and lower product costs through specialization and 
economies of scale. However, transactions costs are created when customers buy from outside 
suppliers instead of making the product themselves. To lower these transaction costs, customers 
and suppliers engage in relationship-specific investments (Williamson 1979), which are assets 
that are customized for a particular user or transaction, and would lose at least part of their value 
if the relationship were terminated (Jia 2013).   
Cost structure 
 Managers’ investment decisions affect the firm’s cost structure, or the relative proportion 
of variable-to-fixed costs that a firm incurs from production. Cost structure decisions are one of 
the most important decisions that managers make because they directly affect firm profitability, 
with more rigid cost structures (i.e. higher proportions of fixed costs) leading to greater 
reductions in profits when sales decline, but higher profits when sales increase. The traditional 
view of cost structure strategy is that firms take steps to offset increased operating and 
environmental risk by adopting less rigid cost structures to minimize the potential downside risk 
associated with fluctuations in sales (Banker et al. 2014). 
 Consistent with the traditional view of cost structure strategy, Kallapur and Eldenberg 
(2005) find that hospitals chose more flexible (less rigid) cost structures, by increasing their ratio 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
available for a small subset of publicly traded companies. Additionally, in contrast to the requirement for suppliers, 
the public companies that are listed as strong customers are not required to list their strong suppliers. 
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of variable-to-fixed costs, after a change in Medicare reimbursement policy that increased the 
uncertainty of hospital’s revenues. Similarly, Holzhacker et al. (2015b) find that hospitals facing 
greater demand uncertainty and financial risk adapt more flexible cost structures by adjusting 
their procurement decisions to use greater outsourcing, leasing of equipment and a greater share 
of contract labor. However, contrary to the traditional view of cost structure strategy, Banker et 
al. (2014) document that demand uncertainty, measured as the standard deviation of changes in 
sales, is positively associated with more rigid cost structures for a sample of manufacturing 
firms. They develop a model predicting that firms will prefer more rigid cost structures when 
facing demand uncertainty in order to capitalize on periods of unusually high demand. More 
generally, their study implies that other types of firm-level risk may have similarly 
“counterintuitive” effects on firm cost structure decisions. 
Development of research questions 
Relationship-specific investments and cost structure 
 Following the logic of TCE theory, suppliers and customers make relationship-specific 
investments to lower the transactions costs of trading with each other. Suppliers compete with 
each other through their ability to lower transaction costs or increase transaction values. Some 
supplier-level relationship investments that help to achieve this goal include investing in 
specialized inventory management systems, hiring dedicated customer service personnel, 
expanding delivery capabilities, and procuring machinery to meet customized orders. The 
managers of supplier firms can choose how to make these relationship-specific investments, 
affecting the firm’s cost structure with their choices. For example, customer service personnel 
can be full-time employees or temporary hourly contractors, delivery trucks and specialized 
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equipment could be purchased or leased, and the manufacturing of custom products can be done 
in-house or outsourced.        
 The TCE literature posits that suppliers bear greater risk when making these investments 
because the customer typically has stronger relative bargaining power. Thus, suppliers can 
choose to manage risk by adopting more flexible cost structures (Kallapur and Eldenberg 2005) 
or commit more resources by choosing more rigid cost structures in hopes of recognizing higher 
demand from strong customers (Banker et al. 2014). An additional risk associated with making 
relationship-specific investments with more rigid cost structures is that the fixed costs associated 
with these investments likely adjust downward more slowly than those of non-relationship 
specific investment because these investments lose value if put to alternative use (if they have 
any alternative use at all).7 In their study on the relationship between relationship life cycle and 
firm profitability, Irvine et al. (2016) examine a sample of firms from various industries and 
document that firms make more fixed costs SG&A investments earlier in their relationship with 
strong customers. They do not, however, find the same relationship for cost of goods sold 
(COGS).  
 The examples of relationship-specific investments given earlier can affect both SG&A 
and COGS cost structures. For example, the decision to insource (outsource) deliveries would 
make SG&A costs more rigid (flexible) while the decision to purchase (lease) equipment for 
meeting specialized orders would make COGS costs more rigid (flexible). Since we focus our 
study on manufacturing firms with differing relationship lengths, we examine the effect of 
customer concentration on cost structure as an empirical question. 
                                                             
7 Downward adjustments refer to the reduction of costs when activity declines. Fixed costs (inherently) adjust 
downward more slowly than variable costs, and the speed that fixed costs adjust downward depends on the type of 
fixed cost. For example, selling a machine with a very specialized use will be harder than selling a machine with a 
generic use.   
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Performance outcomes 
Next we examine how the cost structure of relationship-specific investments affects 
subsequent performance. Williamson (1996) argues that relationship-specific investments 
without safeguards are a form of poor management. While TCE theory focuses on the existence 
of a formal contract between a supplier and customer as the typical form of an economic 
safeguard, a number of studies document that it is common for suppliers to make relationship-
specific investments without formal contracts (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003; Kang et al. 
2008). From a managerial accounting perspective, a major economic safeguard would be to 
choose more flexible cost structures to guard against the risk of losing a major customer since 
costs would adjust downward more quickly should the major customer leave. 
Rather than focusing on safeguards, recent TCE studies have focused on the advantages 
of relationship-specific investments. Kang et al. (2009) extend TCE theory by explaining that 
one reason suppliers make relationship-specific investments without formal contracts is because 
their managers have foresight into the potential benefits of making these decisions. Consistent 
with the intuition of Banker et al. (2014), if managers foresee an increase in demand from a 
strong customer as a potential benefit, they will make relationship-specific investments with 
more rigid cost structures. Additionally, Jia (2013) posits that although relationship-specific 
investments put suppliers at greater risk should the buyer leave, certain types of relationship-
specific investments can bind customers to their suppliers. Thus investing in more relationship-
specific fixed costs could serve to increase customer switching costs and create barriers to entry 
for competing suppliers, which reduces the probability of customer defection (Dekker, 
Sakaguchi, and Kawai 2013).   
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On one hand, choosing a risk avoidance strategy by making relationship-specific 
investments with more flexible cost structures may be more profitable as it safeguards against the 
loss of a major customer. On the other hand, a commitment strategy, where managers make 
relationship-specific investments with a greater proportion of fixed-to-variable costs may be 
more profitable as profits will increase by more as sales to strong customers increase. Since 
theory is mixed on whether a risk avoidance or commitment strategy is, on average, more 
profitable, we follow prior studies (Gunny 2010; Eldenburg et al. 2011; Hall 2016) and compare 
the relative profitability of each strategy by examining their effect on future performance. If a 
risk avoidance (commitment) strategy is preferable then relationship-specific investments with 
more flexible cost structures will be positively (negatively) associated with future performance. 
 
III. Data and methodology 
Sample  
 We build our sample using major customer information reported in the Compustat 
Segment Files, which include data on customer name, type, and revenue contributed to the 
supplier firm. Following Banker et al. (2014), we restrict our sample to manufacturing firms (two 
digit SIC Codes 20 – 39). We also require that the supplier report at least one major customer.8 
We develop a 20-year sample beginning in 1993 and ending in 2012 because we require enough 
leading data to calculate future return on assets. 
 After compiling our sample of supplier firms with customer concentration data, we gather 
additional financial information related to suppliers’ operating costs and sales revenue (REV) 
                                                             
8 While SFAS 131 requires companies to disclose any and all customers who contribute ten percent or more of 
company-wide revenue, firms often choose to disclose customers who contribute less than ten percent of company-
wide revenues based on the importance of such customers to the company (Patatoukas 2012). Following prior 
literature, our analysis uses information about all disclosed major customers regardless of the percentage of revenue 
contributed by each customer.  
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from Compustat. Following Banker et al. (2014) and Irvine et al. (2016), we focus on three cost 
categories: total operating costs (OC), selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA), and cost 
of goods sold (COGS).9  We control for the potential impact of outliers on our analysis by 
truncating observations with values of REV, OC, SGA, and COGS in the highest and lowest 0.5% 
of the distribution. While we exclude observations, which are missing total operating cost data, 
we do not exclude observations missing any of the two sub-categories of operating costs (SGA or 
COGS). Additionally, we restrict our sample to firms with sufficient data to calculate return on 
assets (ROA) for year t+1 in order to facilitate comparability between our main tests and 
performance tests. We are left with a final sample of 26,438 firm-year observations across the 
entire sample period. Table 1 reports a description of the sample composition by industry. 
Observations from firms in the electronic equipment and components industry, 
industrial/commercial machinery and computer equipment industry, and chemicals and allied 
products industry make up slightly more than 50% of the sample.  
< Insert Table 1 About Here > 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. Differences in 
numbers of observations across variables are attributable to missing data. The average (median) 
firm in our sample reported sales revenue of $1,311 ($109) million dollars and total operating 
costs of $1,188 ($107) million. Table 3 reports correlations among the variables used in our 
multivariate tests. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are reported in the upper (lower) diagonal.  
< Insert Tables 2 and 3 About Here > 
Model specification 
                                                             
9 We follow Kama and Weiss (2012) in using operating costs (OC), defined as revenue minus operating income, as a 
summary measure of total firm costs. As we discuss later, inferences are unchanged when separately analyzing 
COGS and SG&A cost rigidity. 
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We construct our customer concentration variable (CC) by adopting the measure 
developed by Patatoukas (2012). This measure allows us to capture both the total number of 
major customers present within a firm’s customer base and their relative importance within the 
firm’s revenue stream. The resulting measure of firm i’s customer concentration in year t, 
essentially a weighted-average index of customer-specific revenue to total firm revenue, is 
described by the following equation: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
)
2
𝐽
𝑗=                    (1) 
where Salesijt represents firm i’s sales to customer j in year t and Salesit represents total sales for 
firm i in year t. Average (median) CC is 0.142 (0.073) for our sample of firms. Detailed variable 
descriptions are provided in Appendix A. 
Following the methodology proposed in prior research (Irvine et al. 2016), we examine 
our research questions using a firm-specific cost elasticity measure. The elasticity of costs with 
respect to sales of a firm in year t is calculated as the log-change in cost between year t-1 and 
year t divided by the log-change in sales from year t-1 to t as defined the equation below: 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) =  
𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡)−𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1)
𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡)−𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1)
 (2) 
Firm-specific elasticities are separately calculated for each cost category (OC, SGA, and COGS). 
We then examine our research questions regarding the relationship between customer 
concentration and cost structure using the following regression specification:10  
Elasticity(Costit) = β0 + β1RankCCit + β2MVEit + β3AGEit + β4GROWTHit  
 + β5FLEVit + β6CONGLOit + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε  (3) 
   
                                                             
10 We use yearly Fama-MacBeth (1973) and Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics to estimate results for equations (3) 
through (7) in order to account for serial correlation in our customer concentration measure. The Newey-West 
adjustment adjusts the Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for serial correlation (up to three lags) in the time-series of 
estimated coefficients. Our inferences are robust to the use of pooled cross-sectional regressions and clustering 
standard errors by firm and year. 
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We estimate equation (4) using three separate specifications of the Elasticity(Cost) term: 
total operating costs (OC Elasticity), selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA Elasticity), 
and cost of goods sold (COGS Elasticity). RankCC is defined as the decile rank of a firm’s 
customer concentration measure for year t. We construct the variable RankCC by first calculating 
the value for CC as described in equation (1) for each firm-year observation. We then rank each 
firm-year observation into deciles based on their CC score and scale the decile rank so that the 
measure takes a value between 0 and 1. We also include controls for a firm’s market value of 
equity (MVE), age (AGE), annual sales growth (GROWTH), and leverage ratio (FLEV). We 
include an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm reports at least two business segments, 
and 0 otherwise (CONGLO). Our model also includes controls for industry fixed effects (IndFE). 
The slope coefficient β1 in this regression equation provides an estimate of the 
relationship between customer concentration and firm cost structure. A negative coefficient 
suggests that customer concentration leads to firms adopting a more rigid cost structure (i.e. 
greater fixed costs) while a positive coefficient suggests that customer concentration leads to 
firms adopting a more elastic cost structure (i.e. less fixed costs).  
 To examine the relative profitability of managers’ relationship-specific cost structure 
decisions, we analyze the impact of these decisions on future firm performance. Future firm 
performance is measured using return on assets (ROA) in years t+1 through t+3. We utilize our 
measure of operating cost structure flexibility (OC Flexibility) to test this relationship. OC 
Flexibility is defined as the decile rank of a firm’s operating cost elasticity measure for year t 
scaled from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating firms with the least elastic (i.e. least flexible) operating cost 
structure and 1 indicating the firms with the most elastic (i.e. most flexible) operating cost 
structure. We also adopt the measure of relationship duration (LINKAGE) from Irvine et al. 
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(2016) as an additional control for our performance tests. LINKAGE is calculated as the weighted 
average duration of strong customer relationships at the end of year t. Our resulting future 
performance regressions are specified below: 
ROAit+n = β0 + β1OC Flexibilityit + β2RankCCit + β3RankCCit * OC Flexibilityit  
 + β4MVEit + β5AGEit + β6GROWTHit + β7FLEVit + β8CONGLOit   (4a) 
 + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε 
ROAit+n = β0 + β1OC Flexibilityit + β2RankCCit + β3RankCCit * OC Flexibilityit  
 + β4ln(LINKAGEit) + β5lRankCCit * ln(LINKAGEit) + β6MVEit + β7AGEit  (4b) 
 + β8GROWTHit + β9FLEVit + β10CONGLOit + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε 
 
 
IV. Empirical results 
Regression results 
Customer concentration and cost structure 
 Table 4 presents our results on the effect of customer concentration on cost structure. 
Estimates of equation (3) for each of the three cost elasticity categories, operating costs (OC), 
SG&A costs (SGA), and cost of goods sold (COGS) are provided. Columns 1 through 3 present 
estimation results for continuous values of our dependent variables while columns 4 through 6 
present estimation results for decile-rank transformed values of these same variables. The 
coefficient for the variable of interest, RankCC, (β1) is negative and significant in the estimates 
of all three cost categories, indicating that firms with greater customer concentration have less 
elastic costs structures. While Irvine et al. (2016) document this effect only for SG&A costs, we 
find a significant negative relationship between RankCC and COGS Elasticity. Since our sample 
includes only manufacturing firms as compared to the broader sample utilized by Irvine et al. 
(2016), this result suggests differences between manufacturers and other types of firms in terms 
of the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure. The results presented in 
Table 4 are consistent with supplier firms making relationship-specific investments with more 
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fixed-to-variable costs, which benefit the firm should sales to strong customers continue and/or 
increase in the future. The sign and direction of our control variables are consistent with those 
shown in Irvine et al. (2016).11  
< Insert Table 4 About Here > 
Future performance 
Next, we test the impact of relationship-specific cost structure decisions on future 
performance.  Results for our estimates of equations (4a) and (4b) are presented in Table 5. The 
coefficient on the interaction term RankCC * OC Flexibility (β3) captures the combined effect of 
the firms relationship-specific cost structure decision on future firm performance. We observe 
positive and statistically significant β3 coefficients in years t+1, t+2, and t+3 (columns 1-3). Our 
results persist after controlling for relationship duration (LINKAGE) (columns 4-6). This result 
indicates that adopting a more flexible cost structure for relationship-specific investments yields 
superior future performance. Complementing the results of Irvine et al. (2016), our results 
indicate that the positive association between relationship length and returns to customer 
concentration extend to subsequent years.  
< Insert Table 5 About Here > 
Supplier industry competition 
We also examine the extent to which competitive pressures impact the effect of 
relationship-specific cost structure decisions on future performance. A number of prior studies 
argue that suppliers in more competitive product markets are at higher risk when facing greater 
customer concentration because strong customers have access to more alternative suppliers 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2016), thereby increasing the risk of defection and lowering the supplier’s 
                                                             
11 Given our consistent results for all cost categories, we focus on total operating costs (OC) when reporting results 
for the remainder of our analyses. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we conduct our analyses using sales, 
general, and administrative costs (SGA) and cost of goods sold (COGS). 
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relative bargaining power (Bucknix and Van den Poel 2005; Hall and Porteus 2006). Thus, our 
finding that adopting more flexible relationship-specific investments is a more profitable strategy 
for firms may be affected by competitive pressures since suppliers at greater risk for strong 
customer defection would benefit more from adopting a risk avoidance strategy. However, it is 
unclear whether competitive pressures may also constrain suppliers in their ability to adopt more 
flexible cost structures. Therefore, we examine the effect of product market competition on 
suppliers’ relationship-specific cost structure decisions in addition to our future performance 
tests. 
To test the effect of competition we adopt two proxies: industry concentration and 
product market fluidity. We use each firm’s three digit SIC Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
in year t to measure industry concentration. Lower (higher) values of HHI indicate fewer (more) 
market participants and lower (higher) levels of competition. As an alternative measure we adopt 
the text-based measure of product market fluidity (Fluid) developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2014), which captures changes in the rivals’ products relative to a firm’s own 
products. 12  Higher values of Fluid indicate greater potential for new market entrants and 
competitive threats. More detailed explanations of each of these competition measures are 
presented in Appendix A. 
We examine our research question related to competitive pressures and future 
performance using subsample analysis, dividing each subsample at the median value of HHI. 
Equation (4b) is estimated for each subsample and coefficients are compared using t-tests from a 
fully interacted model.13 Results of these estimations are reported in Table 6. We again focus our 
                                                             
12 For more detail on the calculation of the Fluidity scores see Hoberg et al. (2014). Fluidity scores are downloaded 
from Gordon Phillip’s website at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/. We thank Hoberg, Phillips and 
Prabhala for allowing access to their data.  
13 We follow Kama and Weiss (2013) in using this methodology. 
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attention on β3, the coefficient on the interaction term RankCC * OC Flexibility. Estimates of β3 
are not significantly different between our low and high competition subsamples for any year 
(t+1 through t+3). This suggests that the performance benefits of adopting a more flexible cost 
structures for relationship-specific investments do not vary due to industry competition. We find 
a qualitatively similar pattern of results when we build our subsample using median splits of 
product market fluidity (FLUID) rather than HHI, although we do not tabulate the results for 
brevity. 
<Table 6 About Here> 
While we find no incremental impact of competition for our performance tests, managers 
of firms operating under higher competition may make different relationship-specific cost 
structure decisions given their lower relative bargaining power. To test this assertion, we use the 
following regressions: 
Elasticity(Costit) = β0 + β1RankCCit + β2HighCompit + β3RankCCit * HighCompit  
 + β4MVEit + β5AGEit + β6GROWTHit + β7FLEVit + β8CONGLOit   (5a) 
 + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε   
 
Elasticity(Costit) = β0 + β1RankCCit + β2HighFluidit + β3RankCCit * HighFluidit  
 + β4MVEit + β5AGEit + β6GROWTHit + β7FLEVit + β8CONGLOit   (5b) 
 + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε   
 
HighComp  (HighFluid) is an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm has an HHI (FLUID) value 
below the sample median in year t. All other variable definitions are the same as those previously 
described. 
Results for estimations of equations (5a) and (5b) are presented in Table 7. In each 
equation, the coefficient β3 relates to our variable of interest: RankCC * HighComp or RankCC * 
HighFluid. Columns 1 and 3 present estimation results for untransformed values of OC Elasticity 
while columns 2 and 4 present estimation results for decile-rank transformed values for OC 
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Elasticity and our controls. Results show a significant negative coefficient on β3 for all 
estimations reported in Table 7. These results suggest that competitive pressures lead firms to 
adopt relationship-specific investments with less flexible (i.e. more rigid) cost structures. Taken 
together, the results from Tables 6 and 7 suggest that high customer concentration firms in more 
competitive markets end up worse off than those in less competitive markets because, on 
average, they make relationship-specific investments with more rigid cost structures even though 
more flexible cost structures yield better performance. 
< Insert Table 7 About Here > 
Additional tests 
 In addition to our main tests, we examine two potential areas where customer 
concentration and cost structure may contribute positively to firm performance that may not be 
fully reflected in our ROA tests: growth in sales to strong customers and relationship duration. 
Theory suggests that firms choosing a commitment strategy are likely to develop deeper 
relationships, resulting in longer relationship durations and higher shares of sales to strong 
customers (Joskow 1987). Table 8, Panel A, reports results for the following regression 
specification: 
Sales Growthit+n = β0 + β1OC Flexibilityit + β2RankCCit + β3RankCCit * OC Flexibilityit  
 + β4MVEit + β5AGEit + β6GROWTHit + β7FLEVit + β8CONGLOit   (6) 
+ Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε 
We calculate growth in sales to strong customers (SC Sales Growth) for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 
and estimate equation (6) separately for each year. Our estimation of equation (6) shown in Table 
8, Panel A, suggests that relationship-specific investments do not yield increased sales growth to 
strong customers. In fact, firms that maintain higher levels of operating cost flexibility realize 
increased sales growth to strong customers in year t + 1. More specifically, if the investments 
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made to increase cost structure rigidity are in service of specific strong customer relationships 
(i.e. relationship-specific investments), our results suggest that these investments are not justified 
by any performance improvement related to sales growth to the intended strong customers.  
<Insert Table 8 About Here> 
 Since Irvine et al. (2016) document that relationship length increases the profitability of 
having more concentrated customers, we examine the effect of relationship-specific cost 
structure decisions on the duration of these relationships as a possible mechanism for these 
investments to benefit suppliers. Table 8, Panel B reports estimation results for the following 
regression equation: 
ln(LINKAGEit+n) = β0 + β1OC Flexibilityit + β2RankCCit  
+ β3RankCCit * OC Flexibilityit + β4ln(LINKAGEit) + β5MVEit  (7)  
+ β6AGEit + β7GROWTHit + β8FLEVit + β9CONGLOit + Σγ1-19IndFEit + ε   
 
Ln(LINKAGE), the natural log of the previously defined LINKAGE variable, is calculated for 
years t+1 through t+3 and equation (7) is separately estimated for each year. 14 Our results 
suggest that the cost structure of relationship-specific investments does not impact on the 
duration of strong customer relationships. In untabulated tests, we identify a subsample of 
supplier-customer pairs with available Compustat data. Using duration tests similar to the ones 
used by Raman and Shahrur (2008), we find qualitatively similar results. 
Robustness checks 
 We check the robustness of our documented relationship between customer concentration 
and cost structure using an alternative, log-linear cost model proposed in prior research (Kallapur 
and Eldenburg 2005; Banker et al. 2014) where log-changes in costs are regressed on concurrent 
log-changes in sales revenues along with controls for GDP growth and firm size (in total 
                                                             
14  We log-transform LINKAGE due to the skewness of the variable, but our result are robust to using the 
untransformed measure as well.  
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assets).15 We report the results of these robustness checks in Table 9. Specifically, column (1) 
presents the re-examination of the main relationship between customer concentration and cost 
structure, while columns 2 and 3 re-examine the effect of competition on this relationship. 
Results from these alternative cost structure models are consistent with our inferences and 
support the robustness of our results.   
<Insert Table 9 About Here> 
 We also test the robustness of our results by re-examining our main performance results 
using SG&A and COGS flexibility in place of operating cost flexibility in Equation 4b. These 
results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient on RankCC * SGA Flexibility is positive and 
statistically significant in years t+2 and t+3 while the coefficient on RankCC * COGS Flexibility 
is positive and significant for all three years. These results support our main finding that risk 
avoidance through greater cost structure flexibility in relationship-specific investments positively 
affects future performance.  
<Insert Table 10 About Here> 
In untabulated results, we use a number of alternative measures and regression 
specifications. For our cost structure tests (Tables 4 and 7), we replace our main customer 
concentration variable with either the raw CC score from Patatoukas (2012) or an indicator 
variable for whether the firm has at least one customer which accounts for more than 10 percent 
of its sales as alternative measures of customer concentration. For our performance tests (Tables 
5 and 6), we redefine operating performance as earnings before interest and income tax or 
earnings before extraordinary items, both deflated by total assets. We also rerun all of our tests 
                                                             
15 See Banker et al. (2014) for a more complete description of the log-linear model specification. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year as suggested by Peterson (2009).    
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excluding years prior to 1997 (the effective year of SFAS 131). Our results are qualitatively 
unchanged when using these alternative measures and specifications.  
 
V. Conclusion 
We examine the performance consequences of relationship-specific cost structure 
decisions. Analyzing cost data for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 1993-2012, we 
find that suppliers making relationship-specific investment with more flexible cost structures (a 
greater degree of variable-to-fixed costs) outperform those making more rigid relationship-
specific investments. We also find that suppliers’ competitive environment has no effect on the 
relative profitability of their relationship-specific cost structure decisions, but that suppliers in 
more competitive industries make less flexible relationship-specific investments, which may 
exacerbate the risk associated with higher customer concentration. Additional analysis indicates 
that relationship-specific investments with more rigid cost structures increase neither future sales 
to strong customers nor the length of the customer-supplier relationship. Overall, our findings 
suggest that a risk avoidance strategy outperforms a commitment strategy in the context of 
relationship-specific cost structure decisions. 
This study contributes to the literature on cost structure by documenting the effects of a 
specific type of cost structure decision on future performance. Our findings inform the current 
discussion about the relative advantages of choosing more flexible versus more rigid cost 
structures (Holzhacker et al. 2015b, Banker et al. 2014). We also identify product market 
competition as an environmental factor influencing relationship-specific cost structure decisions. 
Additionally, we extend the customer concentration literature (Patatoukas 2012; Irvine et al. 
2016) by documenting that the cost structure of relationship-specific investments affects the 
profitability of strong customer relationships. Finally, our results have implications for financial 
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accounting research through identifying cost structure as a potential explanation for previously 
observed increases in financial risk and cost of equity capital associated with higher levels of 
customer concentration (Dhaliwal et al. 2016). 
Our findings should be interpreted with two caveats. First we recognize that the decision 
to make relationship-specific investments are joint decisions between customers and suppliers. 
We cannot observe the negotiation process, thus we cannot infer how much of the observed cost 
structure decision is due to supplier versus customer preferences. As a result, we cannot extend 
our inferences to assess the quality of managers’ first-best preferences about relationship-specific 
cost structure. Second, we follow prior cost structure literature and focus our study to a specific 
industry (Banker et al. 2014; Holzhacker et al. 2015a; Holzhacker et al. 2015b). Thus, our 
findings may not fully extend to other industries. Future studies may wish to investigate the 
relation between relationship-specific cost structure decisions and performance in other types of 
industries or firm level characteristics that affect mangers’ cost structure decisions.  
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APPENDIX A 
Variable definitions 
 
REV Total revenues (in millions) 
OC Total operating costs [revenue minus operating income] (in millions) 
SGA Selling, general, and administrative costs (in millions) 
COGS Cost of goods sold (in millions) 
TA Total assets (in millions) 
OC Elasticity Elasticity of total operating costs for a firm defined as 
(𝑂𝐶𝑡/𝑂𝐶𝑡−1)
(𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡/𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−1)
 
SGA Elasticity 
Elasticity of sales, general, and administrative costs for a firm defined as 
(𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡/𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑡−1)
(𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡/𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−1)
 
COGS Elasticity Elasticity of cost of goods sold costs for a firm defined as 
(𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡/𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡−1)
(𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡/𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡−1)
 
OC Rigidity 
Decile rank of the operating cost elasticity measure (OC Elasticity) scaled to range 
from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the firms with the most rigid (i.e. least elastic) 
operating cost structure and 0 indicating the firms with the least rigid (i.e. most 
elastic) operating cost structure. 
CC 
Customer concentration score for firm i in year t (CCit) equals ∑ (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
)
2
𝐽
𝑗= where 
Salesijt represents firm i’s sales to customer j in year t and Salesit represents total 
sales for firm i in year t 
RankCC Decile rank of the customer concentration variable CC scaled to range from 0 to 1. 
ROA Return on assets defined as net income divided by total assets 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using three digit SIC code 
Fluid 
Product market fluidity score for firm I in year t equals (𝑁𝑖,𝑡 ∙
𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡
‖𝐷𝑡−1,𝑡‖
) where Ni,t is 
a vector indicating which from among all unique product-related words are used by 
firm i during year t and Dt-1,t  is the aggregate change vector which captures overall 
changes in word usage between year t-1 and year t.  
HighComp 
High industry concentration indicator variable equals 1 if the firm's HHI is below 
the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
HighFluid 
High product market fluidity indicator variable equals 1 if the firm's product market 
fluidity is above the sample median, 0 otherwise. 
SC Sales Growth Annual sales growth rate for sales to strong customers for a firm. 
RC Sales Growth 
Annual sales growth rate for sales to customers other than strong customers (i.e. 
regular customers) for a firm. 
LINKAGE 
Weighted average duration of a firm’s strong customer relationships at the end of 
year t. 
MVE Market value of equity. 
AGE 
Firm age measured as the number of years since the first year the firm appears in 
the Compustat Annual Fundamentals database. 
GROWTH Annual sales growth rate between years t-1 and t for a firm. 
FLEV Leverage ratio measured as assets divided by market value of equity for a firm. 
CONGLO 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports at least to business segments and 0 
otherwise. 
Δln Log change operator 
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TABLE 1 
Sample composition by industry 
 
2-Digit 
SIC 
Code 
Industry Name N 
% of 
Sample 
20 Food and Kindred Products 1,295 4.90% 
21 Tobacco Products 62 0.23% 
22 Textile Mill Products 354 1.34% 
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and 
Similar Materials 693 2.62% 
24 Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 242 0.92% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 321 1.21% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 482 1.82% 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 389 1.47% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 4,710 17.82% 
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 249 0.94% 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 680 2.57% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 232 0.88% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 261 0.99% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 764 2.89% 
34 Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and 
Transportation Equipment 833 3.15% 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer 
Equipment 3,563 13.48% 
36 Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, 
Except Computer Equipment 5,479 20.72% 
37 Transportation Equipment 1,383 5.23% 
38 Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical, and Optical Goods; Watches and 
Clocks 3,801 14.38% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 645 2.44% 
    Total
 
26,438 100% 
Table 1 presents the industry composition for the sample of firm-year observations used in this study. The 
sample consists of manufacturing firms (SIC 2000 - 3999) that report at least one strong customer in the 
Compustat Customer Segment database. Observations with values of REV, OC, SGA, or COGS in the highest 
and lowest .5% of the distribution are truncated. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
    Percentiles 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. 25th 50th 75th 
REV 
26,438 $1,310.75 $4,524.16 $23.72 $109.13 $573.61 
OC 
26,438 $1,187.70 $4,162.10 $27.83 $106.94 $524.70 
SGA 
24,710 $302.85 $1,270.58 $9.24 $30.42 $119.63 
COGS 
26,438 $844.65 $3,153.12 $15.19 $68.09 $348.65  
TA 
26,438 $1,559.55 $6,115.13 $27.80 $111.38 $580.56 
EBIT 
26,437 $150.11 $759.17 -$1.28 $4.92 $45.17 
OC Elasticity 
26,438 0.784 1.732 0.512 0.881 1.075 
SGA Elasticity 
24,562 0.656 3.280 0.101 0.683 1.185 
COGS Elasticity 
26,430 0.891 2.157 0.606 0.950 1.208 
CC 
26,438 0.142 0.182 0.023 0.073 0.187 
MVE 
26,438 4.942 2.308 3.359 4.857 6.454 
AGE 
26,438 2.323 0.927 1.792 2.485 3.091 
GROWTH 
26,438 0.212 0.655 -0.035 0.095 0.274 
FLEV 
26,438 2.137 43.993 1.271 1.667 2.440 
CONGLO 
26,438 0.383 0.486 0 0 1 
HHI 
26,438 0.168 0.155 0.058 0.128 0.201 
FLUID 
14,204 6.479 3.603 3.862 5.693 8.290 
ROA 
26,446 -0.056 0.360 -0.091 0.041 0.112 
LINKAGE 
15,400 3.274 2.704 1.000 2.271 4.000 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the study. REV equals a firm’s total revenue in 
year t. OC equals a firm’s total operating costs (in millions) in year t. SGA equals a firm’s selling and general 
costs (in millions) in year t. COGS equals a firm’s cost of goods sold (in millions) in year t. TA equals a firms 
total assets (in millions) in year t. EBIT equals a firms earnings before interest and taxes in year t. Variables 
measured in monetary units are CPI adjusted using 1982-84 as the base year. OC Elasticity is calculated as the 
change in log-OC for firm i from year t-1 to year t. SGA Elasticity is calculated as the change in log-SGA for 
firm i from year t-1 to year t. COGS Elasticity is calculated as the change in log-COGS for firm i from year t-1 
to year t. CC is the measure of a firm’s customer concentration following Patatoukas (2012) for year t. MVE 
equals a firm’s market value of equity for year t. AGE equals a firm’s age in year t. GROWTH equals a firm’s 
annual sales growth rate between year t-1 and year t. FLEV equals a firm’s leverage ratio in year t. CONGLO 
equals 1 if the firm reports at least two business segments, 0 otherwise. HHI is a firm’s Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index for year t based on the firm’s three digit SIC code. FLUID is a firm’s product market fluidity score for 
year t. ROA equals a firms return on assets in year t. LINKAGE is the weighted average duration of a firm’s 
strong customer relationships at the end of year t.  Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlations of main variables 
Variable Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.OC Elasticity 
 0.558** 0.580** 0.137** -0.069** 0.088** 0.041** 0.090** 0.092** 0.121** -0.125** 0.084** 
2. SGA Elasticity 0.580**  -0.036** 0.150** -0.069** 0.108** 0.002 0.132** 0.035** 0.056** -0.060** 0.030** 
3.COGS Elasticity 0.584** -0.016**  0.015** -0.008 0.011 0.018* 0.027** 0.044** 0.058** -0.044** 0.038** 
4. ROA 0.054** 0.033** 0.010**  -0.095** 0.390** 0.192** 0.261** 0.112** -0.042** -0.223** 0.105** 
5. CC -0.027** -0.023** 0.006** -0.089**  -0.055** -0.073** -0.005 -0.135** -0.105** 0.125** -0.076** 
6. MVE 0.026** 0.017** -0.006 0.332** -0.045**  0.218** 0.159** 0.266** 0.129** 0.089** 0.047** 
7. AGE -0.002 -0.013** -0.005 0.185** -0.075** 0.205**  -0.164** 0.312** 0.169** -0.324** 0.173** 
8. GROWTH 0.004 0.011 -0.002 0.011** 0.057** 0.073** -0.218**  -0.047** -0.053** 0.128** -0.090** 
9. CONGLO 0.025** 0.008 0.004** 0.154** -0.128** 0.261** 0.298** -0.080**  0.229** -0.159** 0.186** 
10. FLEV 0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.012 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.009 -0.004  -0.262** 0.218** 
11. FLUID -0.049** -0.032** -0.007** -0.238** 0.140** 0.118** -0.264** 0.154** -0.169** 0.007**  -0.391** 
12. HHI 0.021** 0.015** 0.002** 0.088** -0.034** 0.032** 0.126** -0.056** 0.128** 0.004 -0.275**  
**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. Significance levels are two-tailed for all variables. Spearman correlations are 
reported above the diagonal and Pearson correlations are reported below the diagonal. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 4 
In-sample validation of effect of customer concentration on cost structure 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OC Elasticity 
SGA 
Elasticity 
COGS 
Elasticity 
Rank(OC 
Elasticity) 
Rank(SGA 
Elasticity) 
Rank(COGS 
Elasticity) 
RankCC -0.205*** -0.227*** -0.124*** -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.028*** 
 
(-5.27) (-3.89) (-2.96) (-7.48) (-6.70) (-4.34) 
MVE 0.021*** 0.036*** -0.001 - - - 
 
(3.57) (3.35) (-0.21)    
AGE -0.014 -0.046 -0.000 - - - 
 
(-1.20) (-1.44) (-0.01)    
GROWTH -0.011 0.036 -0.028* - - - 
 
(-0.92) (1.30) (-1.78)    
FLEV 0.001 0.003 0.000 - - - 
 
(1.26) (1.17) (0.48)    
Rank(MVE) - - - 0.006*** 0.012*** -0.002 
    (6.35) (9.93) (-1.40) 
Rank(AGE) - - - 0.001** -0.001 0.002** 
    (2.15) (-0.88) (2.44) 
Rank(GROWTH) - - - 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.004** 
    (3.54) (5.39) (2.82) 
Rank(LEV) - - - 0.006*** 0.002** 0.004*** 
    (6.48) (2.26) (4.97) 
CONGLO 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.030*** 0.002 0.022*** 
 
(1.24) (0.82) (1.20) (4.40) (0.24) (4.48) 
       
ΣIndustryFE included included included included included included 
n 26,438 24,562 26,430 26,438 24,562 26,430 
Avg. R2 0.0247 0.0245 0.0215 0.0723 0.0642 0.0411 
Table 4 presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for equation (3) as described on page 16. We 
examine elasticities related to three types of costs: operating costs (OC Elasticity), selling, general, and administrative 
costs (SGA Elasticity), and cost of goods sold (COGS Elasticity). Columns (1) through (3) report estimations using 
untransformed values for OC Elasticity, SGA Elasticity, COGS Elasticity, MVE, AGE, GROWTH, CONGLO, and LEV. 
Columns (4) through (6) report estimations using rank transformed values for these same variables. IndustryFE are 
industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. Newey-West -adjusted t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
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Main results: Effect of relationship-specific cost structure on future performance 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
OC Flexibility 0.032 0.023 -0.011 0.006 0.012 0.017 
 
(1.16) (1.00) (-0.43) (0.13) (0.36) (0.47) 
RankCC -0.215*** -0.238*** -0.288*** -0.278*** -0.302*** -0.317*** 
 
(-10.10) (-7.17) (-8.42) (-6.79) (-6.81) (-3.99) 
RankCC * OC Flexibility 0.186*** 0.224*** 0.286*** 0.200*** 0.256*** 0.208*** 
 
(4.79) (4.93) (5.79) (3.21) (5.35) (3.06) 
ln(LINKAGE) - - - 0.016 0.016 0.002 
 
   (1.65) (1.04) (0.16) 
RankCC * ln(LINKAGE) - - - 0.059*** 0.061** 0.091** 
 
   (3.35) (2.49) (2.34) 
MVE 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 
 (16.08) (11.70) (10.44) (8.33) (7.08) (6.26) 
AGE 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 
 (6.36) (5.54) (4.75) (5.61) (5.44) (3.95) 
GROWTH -0.042** -0.051*** -0.071*** -0.039* -0.045*** -0.067*** 
 (-2.70) (-4.11) (-3.80) (-1.95) (-2.83) (-3.50) 
FLEV -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (-1.32) (0.33) (0.75) (-0.10) (-0.42) (1.07) 
CONGLO 0.031** 0.042*** 0.049*** 0.021 0.029* 0.044*** 
 
(2.22) (3.15) (3.79) (1.32) (2.02) (3.46) 
       
ΣIndustryFE included included included included included included 
n 26,438 24,450 22,471 15,396 14,218 13,090 
Avg. R2 0.1181 0.1094 0.1010 0.1561 0.1593 0.1497 
Table 5 presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for equations (4a) and (4b) as described on page 18. 
We examine return on assets (ROA) for years t+1, t+2, and t+3. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s 
two digit SIC code. Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
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Effect of competition on the relation between relationship-specific cost structure and future 
performance  
 
 
ROAt+1  ROAt+2  ROAt+3  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 
Low 
Competition 
High 
Competition 
Δ 
Low 
Competition 
High 
Competition 
Δ 
Low 
Competition 
High 
Competition 
Δ 
OC Flexibility 0.008 -0.014  0.029 0.022  0.029 0.032  
 
(0.37) (-0.12)  (1.02) (0.43)  (0.48) (0.49)  
RankCC -0.250*** -0.319***  -0.199*** -0.383***  -0.233** -0.377***  
 
(-4.40) (-3.93)  (-3.12) (-5.66)  (-2.27) (-3.65)  
RankCC * OC Flexibility 0.215*** 0.209  0.172** 0.285***  0.206 0.182*  
 
(3.27) (1.27)  (2.09) (3.95)  (1.36) (1.80)  
ln(LINKAGE) 0.026** 0.010  0.029* 0.006  0.022 -0.002  
 
(2.53) (0.42)  (2.01) (0.19)  (1.40) (-0.14)  
RankCC * ln(LINKAGE) 0.043 0.064**  0.040 0.070  0.043 0.112**  
 
(1.44) (2.08)  (1.14) (1.68)  (0.98) (2.54)  
MVE 0.039*** 0.060*** ‡ 0.034*** 0.055*** ‡ 0.040*** 0.054*** † 
 (6.13) (7.24)  (6.55) (6.33)  (5.77) (5.02)  
AGE 0.045*** 0.077***  0.057*** 0.073***  0.062*** 0.051*  
 (4.72) (3.29)  (4.47) (4.17)  (5.75) (2.01)  
GROWTH -0.108 -0.021  -0.059* -0.038*  -0.079 -0.074***  
 (-1.22) (-0.95)  (-1.78) (-1.93)  (-1.01) (-3.52)  
FLEV -0.002 0.001  0.002 -0.001  0.002 0.002  
 (-1.39) (0.62)  (0.96) (-0.34)  (1.31) (0.45)  
CONGLO 0.013* 0.024  0.020* 0.036  0.014 0.075***  
 
(1.90) (0.65)  (2.02) (1.46)  (0.89) (3.32)  
          
ΣIndustryFE included included  included included  included included  
n 7,644 7,752  7,066 7,152  6,506 6,584  
Avg. R2 0.2108 0.2032  0.2265 0.2162  0.2075 0.2272  
Table 6 presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth regressions for equation (4b) as described on page 18. We examine return on assets (ROA) for 
years t+1, t+2, and t+3. Subsamples are constructed based on supplier industry competition levels as measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Firm-year observations with HHI scores above the sample median are assigned to the low competition subsample while firm-year 
observations with HHI scores below the sample median are assigned to the high competition subsample. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects 
based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. † and ‡ are used to denote statistically significant differences in model 
coefficients at the 5 and 1% level, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
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Effect of supplier industry competition on relationship-specific cost structure decisions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (2) 
 
OC Elasticity 
Rank 
(OC Elasticity) 
OC Elasticity 
Rank 
(OC Elasticity) 
RankCC -0.102* -0.017 -0.035 -0.014 
 
(-1.94) (-1.62) (-0.58) (-0.96) 
HighComp 0.063 0.019** - - 
 
(1.34) (2.17) 
  
RankCC * HighComp -0.206** -0.078*** - - 
 
(-2.59) (-5.09) 
  
HighFluid - - -0.086 -0.022** 
 
  (-1.44) (-2.31) 
RankCC * HighFluid - - -0.202** -0.076*** 
   
(-2.19) (-5.78) 
MVE 0.022*** - 0.033*** - 
 
(3.63) 
 
(4.38) 
 
AGE -0.016 - -0.036 - 
 
(-1.37) 
 
(-1.54) 
 
GROWTH -0.011 - -0.006 - 
 
(-0.91) 
 
(-0.33) 
 
FLEV 0.001 - 0.000 - 
 
(1.29) 
 
(0.20) 
 
Rank(MVE) - 0.007*** - 0.008*** 
  
(6.40) 
 
(6.13) 
Rank(AGE) - 0.001* - -0.000 
  (1.76)  (-0.36) 
Rank(GROWTH) - 0.007*** - 0.007** 
  (3.50)  (2.45) 
Rank(FLEV) - 0.006*** - 0.007*** 
  (6.26)  (4.61) 
CONGLO 0.043 0.028*** 0.068** 0.034*** 
 (1.22) (4.31) (2.36) (5.84) 
     
ΣIndustryFE included included included Included 
N 26,438 26,438 14,199 14,199 
Avg. R2 0.027 0.0762 0.0322 0.0938 
Table 7 presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth regressions for equations (5a) and (5b) as describe on page 21. These tests examine the 
impact on supplier industry competition on the relationship between customer concentration and firm cost structure. We examine 
operating cost elasticity (OC Elasticity) as our dependent variable. Columns (1) and (3) report estimations using untransformed values 
for OC Elasticity, MVE, AGE, GROWTH, CONGLO, and LEV. Columns (2) through (4) report estimations using rank transformed 
values for these same variables. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. Newey-West-adjusted t-
statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
TABLE 8 
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Sales growth and relationship duration results 
 
Panel A: Strong customer sales growth 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
SC Sales Growtht+1 SC Sales Growtht+2 SC Sales Growtht+3 
OC Flexibility -0.167*** -0.003 0.004 
 
(-3.76) (-0.07) (0.08) 
RankCC -0.709*** -0.307*** -0.253*** 
 
(-9.64) (-3.98) (-5.41) 
RankCC * OC Flexibility 0.225*** -0.061 -0.021 
 
(3.20) (-0.67) (-0.20) 
MVE -0.005** -0.005 -0.011*** 
 
(-2.56) (-1.30) (-2.91) 
AGE -0.016 -0.003 0.005 
 
(-1.34) (-0.27) (0.28) 
GROWTH 0.089*** -0.007 -0.003 
 
(4.50) (-0.40) (-0.27) 
FLEV -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.12) (0.22) (0.64) 
CONGLO -0.032* -0.024* -0.027** 
 (-2.00) (-1.95) (-2.25) 
    
ΣIndustryFE included included included 
n 26,425 19,111 15,710 
Avg. R2 0.0603 0.0428 0.0384 
Table 8, panel A presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth regressions for equation (6) as described on page 
22. These tests examine the impact of customer concentration and firm cost structure on future total sales 
growth to strong customers (SC Sales Growth). IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two 
digit SIC code. Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions 
are presented in Appendix A. 
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Panel B: Strong customer relationship duration 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
ln(LINKAGEt+1) ln(LINKAGEt+2) ln(LINKAGEt+3) 
OC Flexibility -0.002 0.015 -0.008 
 
(-0.19) (1.26) (-0.59) 
RankCC -0.005 0.005 -0.009 
 
(-0.79) (0.46) (-0.51) 
RankCC * OC Flexibility 0.008 -0.002 0.035 
 
(0.65) (-0.18) (1.33) 
ln(LINKAGEt) 0.708*** 0.530*** 0.420*** 
 (41.44) (15.62) (9.08) 
MVE -0.002* -0.002* 0.003 
 
(-2.07) (-1.86) (0.77) 
AGE 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.010** 
 
(5.68) (4.02) (2.58) 
GROWTH -0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
(-0.77) (0.01) (0.39) 
FLEV -0.001 -0.016 -0.014 
 
(-1.44) (-1.02) (-0.96) 
CONGLO -0.015*** -0.012** -0.008 
 (-3.88) (-2.73) (-1.63) 
    
ΣIndustryFE included included included 
n 11,435 8,316 6,034 
Avg. R2 0.9322 0.9063 0.8932 
Table 8, Panel B presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for equation (7) as described on 
page 23. These results examine the impact of customer concentration and firm cost structure on the weighted 
average duration of a firm’s strong customer relationships (LINKAGE) at the end of each of years t+1, t+2, 
and t+3. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC code. Newey-West-adjusted t-
statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 9 
Robustness: Customer concentration and cost structure 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Δln(OC) Δln(OC) Δln(OC) 
Δln(REV) 0.672*** 0.645*** 0.582*** 
 (16.45) (15.38) (10.68) 
RankCC * Δln(REV) -0.226*** -0.141*** -0.157*** 
 
(-10.42) (-4.25) (-3.73) 
HighComp * Δln(REV) - -0.021 - 
 
 
(-0.82) 
 HighComp * RankCC * Δln(REV) - -0.118*** - 
 
 
(-2.97) 
 HighComp - 0.018*** - 
 
 
(6.91) 
 HighFluid * Δln(REV) - - -0.091*** 
 
  
(-2.89) 
HighFluid * RankCC * Δln(REV) - - -0.132*** 
 
  
(-2.68) 
HighFluid - - 0.024*** 
 
  
(8.51) 
RankCC 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (10.24) (9.80) (7.67) 
    
Controls included included included 
Controls * Δln(REV) included included included 
ΣIndustryFE included included included 
ΣIndustryFE * Δln(REV) included included included 
N 26,446 26,446 14,204 
Adj. R2 0.6623 0.6655 0.6807 
Table 10 presents OLS estimation results for robustness tests of our main tests from Table 4 and our supplier 
industry competition tests from Table 7. The symbol Δln represents the log change operator defined as the 
natural log of (Xit / Xit-1). We examine three types of costs: Operating costs (OC), selling, general, and 
administrative costs (SGA), and cost of goods sold (COGS). For brevity, only estimates for operating costs are 
presented. REV equals a firm’s total revenue in year t. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s 
two digit SIC code. T-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year (Peterson 2009). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 10 
Robustness: Effect of relationship-specific cost structure of SG&A and COGS on future 
performance 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
RankCC -0.212*** -0.252*** -0.274*** -0.259*** -0.273*** -0.332*** 
 
(-3.83) (-5.42) (-3.66) (-7.57) (-6.19) (-5.39) 
SGA Flexibility 0.039 0.013 0.013 - - - 
 
(1.08) (0.65) (0.50)    
RankCC * SGA Flexibility 0.097 0.188*** 0.150** - - - 
 
(1.50) (4.18) (2.38)    
COGS Flexibility - - - -0.049 -0.027 -0.075** 
    (-1.33) (-0.79) (-2.58) 
RankCC * COGS Flexibility - - - 0.154** 0.182*** 0.226*** 
    (2.66) (3.10) (3.34) 
ln(LINKAGE) 0.018* 0.016 -0.001 0.018* 0.018 0.003 
 
(1.88) (1.04) (-0.14) (1.94) (1.23) (0.21) 
RankCC * ln(LINKAGE) 0.064** 0.066*** 0.107*** 0.059*** 0.060** 0.090** 
 
(2.63) (2.97) (3.11) (3.21) (2.39) (2.28) 
MVE 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 
 (8.31) (7.28) (6.49) (8.23) (6.92) (6.14) 
AGE 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.054*** 
 (3.47) (4.38) (3.70) (5.56) (5.52) (3.96) 
GROWTH -0.044 -0.059*** -0.046* -0.039* -0.046*** -0.068*** 
 (-1.60) (-3.36) (-1.79) (-1.84) (-2.86) (-3.60) 
FLEV -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (-0.20) (0.23) (0.88) (-0.25) (-0.41) (1.01) 
CONGLO 0.028*** 0.030* 0.043** 0.025 0.034** 0.046*** 
 
(2.87) (1.86) (2.82) (1.52) (2.24) (3.47) 
       
ΣIndustryFE included included included included included included 
n 14,234 13,137 12,083 15,389 14,213 13,085 
Avg. R2 0.1326 0.1487 0.1256 0.1518 0.1531 0.1464 
Table 10 presents results of yearly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for equations (4a) and (4b) as described on page 
17. We examine return on assets (ROA) for years t+1, t+2, and t+3. SGA Flexibility (COGS Flexibility) is the decile rank 
of the SG&A (Cost of Goods Sold) elasticity measure scaled to range from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating the firms with the 
most elastic (i.e. most flexible) operating costs. IndustryFE are industry fixed effects based on the firm’s two digit SIC 
code. Newey-West-adjusted t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Detailed variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
A. 
  
